Key drivers of EU budget allocation: Does power matter? by Kurz, Sascha et al.
Key drivers of EU budget allocation: Does power
matter?
Vera Zaporozhets∗ Mar´ıa Garc´ıa-Valin˜as† Sascha Kurz‡
Abstract
We examine the determinants of the EU budget expenditures allocation
among different countries. In line with earlier literature, we consider two alter-
native explanations for the EU budget distribution: political power vs. “needs
view.” Extending the original data set from Kauppi and Widgre´n (2004), we
analyze the robustness of their predictions when applying a different measure
of power and more sophisticated econometric techniques. We conclude that
the nucleolus is a good alternative to the Shapley-Shubik index in distributive
situations such as the case of EU budget allocation. Our results also show that
when explaining budget shares, the relative weight of political power based on
the nucleolus is lower than the predictions of previous studies based on the
Shapley-Shubik index.
Keywords: EU policies, budget allocation, political power, nucleolus, Shapley-
Shubik index.
JEL codes: D72, D78, H61, O52
∗Corresponding Author. Toulouse School of Economics (LERNA, INRA), e-mail: vza-
poroz@toulouse.inra.fr
†University of Oviedo
‡University of Bayreuth
1
1 Introduction
In 2013, the European Union (EU) expenditure budget was around 149 billion,
with cohesion, and agricultural and environmental resources being the primary EU
policies, with shares of 46.8% and 39.8% respectively. Due to the magnitude of these
figures, the distribution of the EU budget among different countries is a crucial issue
to analyze. In particular, we focus on the relative weights of different factors when
explaining the budget shares corresponding to each EU member.
Previous literature (Courchene et al., 1993; Anderson and Tyers, 1995; Tanger-
mann, 1997; Kandogan, 2000; Kauppi and Widgre´n, 2004, 2007) has tested two al-
ternative explanations of the EU budget distribution across the members states. The
first is a “needs view,” which states that the budget allocation is determined by the
principles of solidarity. According to this hypothesis, the countries with a high agri-
culture sector weighting and/or a relatively worse economic situation emerge as the
major recipients of the EU budget. In fact, some of the previous studies have fo-
cused exclusively on this explanation (Courchene et al., 1993; Anderson and Tyers,
1995; Tangermann, 1997). The second explanation is that budget allocation across
the members is reflected by the distribution of their political power. Thus, those
countries with more power in the allocation process could receive larger shares of the
budget.
Some studies combine both: needs and the power views (Kandogan, 2000; Kauppi
and Widgre´n, 2004, 2007; Aksoy, 2010). Thus, empirical analysis by Kauppi and
Widgre´n (2004) shows the strong prevalence of political power motives.
Their results indicate that political power has much higher weight than needs when
determining the allocation of budget expenditures among EU member states.
The overall purpose of this paper is to reconsider the analysis of Kauppi and
Widgre´n (2004) and to challenge their conclusions. To do so, we extend the original
data set (1976-2001) up to 2012 and introduce alternative model specifications. In
contrast to the existing studies which have used the Shapley-Shubik index as a mea-
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sure of political power, we employ a different measure; the nucleolus. It has been
argued that the nucleolus is an appropriate power measure in distributive situations
as well as a good alternative to traditional measures, such as the Shapley-Shubik
index.1 Moreover, we apply sophisticated econometric techniques, which are more
suitable for the analysis.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction on the
EU budget, including the processes of designing and allocating EU expenditures and
revenues. In Section 3, we discuss the theoretical properties of two different power
indices. Specifically, we highlight the advantages of the nucleolus over other indices
in distributive situations, such as the EU budget allocation. Finally, in Section 4, we
specify a simple empirical model in order to determine the key drivers for EU budget
allocation. Section 5 concludes with a summary of the main findings in addition to
some policy implications.
2 EU budget: procedure and evolution
As mentioned in the Introduction, the EU expenditure budget represents a significant
amount of resources. In 2013, total expenditures were 148,468 million. Although this
is not a substantial amount in relative terms (just 1.13% of the EU-27 Gross National
Income, GNI), some crucial policies were developed using EU funding. Examples are
the Common Agricultural Policy (now part of a more extensive section on the preser-
vation and management of natural resources) or several policies oriented towards the
economic development of some target regions (cohesion and competitiveness policies).
Each EU member also has to contribute to the EU budget, by means of GNI-based
resources (74.3%), VAT-based own resources (9.5%), and traditional own resources
(TOR, 10.4%).
In 1976, the EU expenditure budget amounted to 7,563 million. In the last decades,
1For example, Montero (2005), Montero (2013) and Le Breton et al. (2012) among others.
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the EU budget has been growing.2 This increasing path can be interpreted as a snap
that simultaneously captures the history of EU integration and several budgetary
reforms. Regarding the enlargement process, there are some significant facts which
could have an impact on the evolution of the EU expenditures. In 1986, the EU
grew from 10 to 12 countries, through the integration of Portugal and Spain as new
members. Similarly, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU/EC in 1995. Fur-
thermore, one of the largest phases of expansion occurred in 2004, when the EU grew
from 15 to 25 member countries.3
Successive EU reforms have changed the structure of the budget. In this respect
there are some facts that are worth mentioning. At the Brussels European Council
in February 1988, a political agreement on doubling, in real terms, the budget of the
Structural Funds between 1987 and 1993 was reached. Subsequently, Member States
agreed at the Edinburgh European Council in December 1992 that the budget for
structural operations would be further increased, specifically for the cohesion countries
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). Also in Edinburgh, Member States decided
to strengthen some particular policies, such as research and development, external
actions and financial aid to Central and Eastern European countries. Although there
were several agreements on setting budgetary limits to the growth rate of expenditure,
the basis of a stringent budgetary discipline was established in the Agenda 2000
agreements. These reforms have all had an impact on the level and the structure of
budget expenditures, and have led to some changes in the accounting system. The
budget has therefore undergone some structural reforms, the most significant being
those of 1992 and 2006.
Regarding the procedure for elaboration and approval of the EU budget, there
are several institutions involved. The European Commission, the Council and the
2Figures on the EU budget are available at http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/index n.cfm.
3The new members were the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Poland.
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Parliament participate in the process of elaborating the EU budget. However, over the
past decades, the role of each institution, as well as the voting rules, have undergone
a number of changes (Kauppi and Widgre´n, 2007). The relationship between the
Council and the Parliament was controversial until the 1992 Edinburgh meeting,
where an Interinstitutional Agreement between both institutions was established in
order to facilitate the process of making budgetary decisions.
The budget elaboration process involves the following steps. First, based on the
multi-annual financial framework in force and the budgetary guidelines for the coming
year, the European Commission prepares a preliminary draft budget. Within this
stage, spending priorities are established, plus caps or ceilings to limit the maximum
growth rate of different budgetary sections and the total budget.
Once a preliminary draft is drawn up, the European Commission submits it to the
Council and the Parliament. The budgetary authority, comprising both institutions,
amends and subsequently adopts the draft budget. The Council is then expected
to adopt its position on the preliminary draft budget proposed by the Commission,
elaborate and approve a definitive draft budget. Next, the Parliament can modify
the draft, by adopting amendments to the Council’s position, or by proposing some
amendments to particular expenses. The final proposed document is then approved
by simple majority by the Parliament. Following this, the Council has a second
reading of the document, adopting it by a larger majority than that required at the
Parliament.4 A second reading by the Parliament and the definitive adoption marks
the end of the process.
In this paper, we consider the voting decisions of the Council (Bindseil and Hantke,
1997; Kauppi and Widgre´n, 2004). Although the Parliament has recently increased
their weight in the EU decision process,5 some EU institutional features have sup-
4Usually, at least a qualified majority is required to adopt budgetary decisions at the Council.
5The Treaty of Lisbon extended the role of the Parliament. It was signed by the EU member
states on 13 December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009. From that moment,
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ported the approach based on the voting framework at the Council.6
3 Power indices: the nucleolus versus the Shapley-
Shubik index
In recent decades, there has been a growing literature, both theoretical and applied,
on power measures. However, as yet, there is no consensus as to the best way to
measure power. While analyzing the distribution of the EU budget among different
countries, previous studies have applied the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI) (Kauppi and
Widgre´n, 2004), one of the mostly commonly used power measures in this context. By
contrast, in this study we propose an alternative measure, the nucleolus7 (Schmeidler,
1969). In the following, we provide strong arguments to support our choice. In the
subsequent section, we compare how the two indices perform in practice, and analyze
whether the conclusions reached by Kauppi and Widgre´n (2004) are robust with
regard to their choice of power index.
European Parliament could decide on both compulsory and non-compulsory expenses, extending its
power and responsibilities with regard to the budget making process. With the entry into force of
the Treaty of Lisbon a new system known as a “double majority” was introduced. It entered into
force on 1 November 2014. The Nice system remained applicable during the transition period up to
31 October 2014. For an interesting discussion on the Treaty of Nice, see Heinemann (2003).
6Among others, the approval procedure applied during the period analyzed in this research (1976-
2012) and the qualified majority required at the Council to approve the final EU budget.
7Thus, Felsenthal and Machover (1998) argue that the SSI is a measure of “P-power,” where
P stands for “purse,” and it evaluates a voter’s expected relative share of a fixed budget. As we
argue in the paper (see also Le Breton et al. (2012)) the nucleolus can also be considered a power
measure in the distributive setting, and can be a good alternative to the SSI. Consequently, in this
paper we focus on these two measures. At the same time, the SSI can also be considered a measure
of “I-power” (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998), which assesses the probability of a player casting a
decisive vote. Other measures of I-power include the Banzhaf index, the Johnston index, and the
Deegan-Packel index.
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The general discussion on which power measure is best, and which properties it
should possess, remains open. Napel and Widgre´n (2004) therefore divide existing
studies on power indices into two “disjoint methodological camps,” and propose a
unified framework to link them: “On the one hand, such a framework should allow
for predictions and ex post analysis of decisions based on knowledge of procedures
and preferences. On the other hand, it must be open to ex ante and even completely
a priori analysis of power when detailed information may either not be available or
should be ignored for normative reasons.” We address the discussion in a specific
distributional setting, that is, the allocation of a fixed budget across the members of
an organization, with the key preference assumption being that each member cares
only about their own share.
Following Napel and Widgre´n (2004), let us consider two requirements in turn.
First, the power measure should be based on the explicit decision-making procedures
and the knowledge of the preferences. To this end, it is important that the political
analysis takes into account game forms. In this respect, both the SSI and the nucleolus
are suitable measures to analyze bargaining situations such as the distribution of the
EU budget. Each of the two measures are founded on a non-cooperative framework,
in that either of them arises as a payoff from a well-specified bargaining game.8
According to the second requirement, one would not want the power analysis to
8For instance, Gul (1989) constructs a non-cooperative game mimicking bargaining process in the
markets. One of the main results state that the payoffs associated with efficient equilibria converge
to the agents’ Shapley values as the time between periods of the dynamic game goes to zero. Even
though Gul’s bargaining procedure is very natural, his results are not relevant for majority games.
Some examples of a less natural bargaining procedure but more general results are Hart and Mas-
Colell (1996) and Vidal-Puga (2008). As for the nucleolus, it has been proved to correspond to the
vector of expected payoffs in the legislative bargaining game with random proposers according to
Baron and Ferejohn (1989), where voters directly put forward proposals and vote over the division
of a budget. If proposal probabilities coincide with the nucleolus, then the nucleolus is the unique
vector of expected payoffs (Montero, 2006). The equality of the expected payoffs to the nucleolus
also holds for other proposal probabilities depending on the voting game.
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be extremely sensitive to the details of the game form used to describe the non-
cooperative decision process. In the following, we show that only the nucleolus passes
this test.
In order to encompass the idea of a robust power measure in our specific distri-
butional framework, we address the bargaining set, a solution concept for coalitional
games (Maschler et al., 2013). The idea behind the bargaining set is that when the
players decide how to divide the worth of the coalition, the player who is not satis-
fied with the proposed share may object to it. The objection goes against another
player, calling for this player to share their part with the objecting one. The player
against whom the objection is made may (or may not) have a counter objection. An
objection which does not have a counter objection is called justified. The bargaining
set consists of all imputations in which no player has a justified objection against any
other player.
It seems that the bargaining set properly describes the decision-making procedure
within EU institutions (see Section 2). Additionally, one of the properties of the
bargaining set is that, contrary to the core, it is never empty. However, the bargaining
set is often large, in which case there is the problem of choosing a unique outcome. In
such cases, the nucleolus is a good candidate, since it always exists, it is unique and it
belongs to the bargaining set. On the contrary, in general the Shapley value is not in
the bargaining set. The following example supports this argument. Let us consider
three individuals with individual one being a vetoer. This means that a decision is
passed only when player one is present in a group voting for the decision, however if
they are on their own, they cannot get the decision passed. In such a situation, the
core, the nucleolus, and the bargaining set coincide, and attribute the whole surplus
to player one. On the contrary, the Shapley-Shubik index is (2/3, 1/6, 1/6). One
may check that under the distribution according to the Shapley-Shubik index, player
one has an objection. For example, player one can offer player two to share the part
of player three. In this setting, player one has a lot of power, and only one extra
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vote is needed to validate the decision. The nucleolus models the process of Bertrand
competition between players two and three.
To summarize, both the SSI and the nucleolus have foundations in non-cooperative
bargaining games, which make them suitable for ex post political analysis. However,
only the nucleolus satisfies the requirement of being a measure that is open to an ex
ante analysis of the distributive situations, as stated in Napel and Widgre´n (2004).
Given our specific framework, these arguments allow us to favour the nucleolus versus
the SSI in the empirical analysis of the EU budget distribution. In the Appendix, we
provide the formal definitions for the SSI and the nucleolus, as well as the figures for
both power measures for the period 1958-2012.
3.1 Example
In this subsection we provide computations of the SSI and the nucleolus for the first
EU Council of Ministers (1958 - 1972). During that period the Council consisted
of representatives from six countries. The three “big” countries (Germany, Italy
and France) held four votes each, the two “medium” countries (Belgium and the
Netherlands) held two votes each and the “little” country (Luxembourg) held one
vote. A qualified majority was set at 12 out of 17, i.e., passing a decision required
at least 12 votes in favour of the decision. As has been highlighted in a number of
studies,9 Luxembourg was powerless in such a situation. Since other member states
held an even number of votes, Luxembourg was never formally able to make any
difference in the voting process. The results are summarized in Table 1.
According to the nucleolus, a “medium” country receives half as much weight as a
“big” country. This is quite intuitive, since in a minimal winning coalition,10 a “big”
9For example, Felsenthal and Machover (1997), among others.
10A minimal winning coalition is a group of countries whereby if they all vote in favour of a decision,
it is passed. Furthermore, none of the countries can be excluded, i.e., if one of the countries change
the vote from “yes” to “no” the decision can no longer be passed. In this scenario, there are two
9
Table 1: The Council of Ministers (1958 - 1972).
Country Weight SSI Nucl
Germany 4 0.233 0.250
Italy 4 0.233 0.250
France 4 0.233 0.250
Belgium 2 0.150 0.125
Netherlands 2 0.150 0.125
Luxembourg 1 0 0
Quota 12
Total votes 17
Quota (%) 70.59
country can be replaced by two “medium” ones. Such substitutability often holds for
the nucleolus in contrast to other power indices, but it does not hold in all cases.11 As
a consequence, in this case the nucleolus treats all minimal winning coalitions equally.
It prescribes the total “wealth” for both types of coalitions as being equal to 0.75.
In contrast, according to the SSI, the minimal winning coalitions of the first and the
second type get different values, 0.766 and 0.7 respectively.
We now highlight another interesting feature of the nucleolus. In 1973, when
compared to 1958, the “big” countries get the same power according to the nucleolus.
However, other countries, even though they are not dummies, get zero. This is
impossible for the SSI or other power indices, but it is not unusual for the nucleolus.12
types of the minimal winning coalitions: three ”big” countries, or two “big” countries and two
“medium” countries.
11For a more detailed discussion see, for example, Montero (2005).
12See, for example, Montero (2005).
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As a result, the nucleolus is very different from the SSI and other indices in this
example.
4 Empirical Application
4.1 Data and empirical model
As explained in the Introduction, this paper aims to identify significant key drivers
and trends for EU budget allocation. In order to discuss the findings of Kauppi and
Widgre´n (2004), we extend their data set to include observations for the period 1976-
2012. Interestingly, this period covers different phases of EU integration: from 1976
to 1980 (EU9), from 1981 to 1985 (EU10), from 1986 to 1994 (EU12), from 1995 to
2003 (EU15), from 2004 to 2006 (EU25) and from 2007 to 2012 (EU27).13
In this respect, a general model will be proposed, where the budget share on the
whole EU budget of each country depends on an index of political power and a set
of variables representative of budgetary needs. The empirical model is presented as
follows:
bit = f(pit, Zit) + uit, (1)
where bit is the percentage of the total EU expenditure budget allocated to country
i in the year t, pit is an index of political power for country i and period t, and Zit is a
vector of factors representative of country i’s needs in period t. Finally, uit represents
the error term.
We have proposed two alternative specifications of the dependent variable, follow-
ing the procedure suggested by Kauppi and Widgre´n (2004). On the one hand, we
13Although data for 2013 are available, this last year was removed from the dataset. This is the
first year with EU-28 with Croatia as a new EU member, so in the context of unbalanced panel
data methods, this observation would need to be dropped since there is only one period for that
observation (Bluhm, 2013; Wooldridge, 2010a).
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consider the total expenditure budget share that each country gets in the negotiation
process (exp). On the other hand, an alternative variable is defined, introducing an
adjustment to take into account the UK’s budget rebate and other similar compen-
sations (expadj).
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We also use some of the original variables proposed by Kauppi and Widgre´n (2004)
as independent variables. First, two different alternatives to measure political power
discussed in the previous section are included in the analysis;15 namely, the SSI (pssi)
and the nucleolus (pnucl). The latter power index was not originally included by
Kauppi and Widgre´n (2004), but has been considered for a comparison to be made
with the SSI. Additionally, needs are shown using a set of variables (Z): each country’s
share of the total agricultural production (agri), and the ratio of each country’s GDP
per capita and the EU wide GDP per capita (income). Table 2 shows some descriptive
statistics of the main variables:16
14This rebate was a compensatory payment made to the UK government in 1985. The main
argument in the rebate negotiations was that a high proportion of the EU budget was spent on
the Common Agricultural Policy (or CAP), which benefits the UK much less than other countries,
as it has a relatively small farming sector as a percentage of GDP. The compensation consists of
reallocating some of the original UK monetary contributions to be paid by the remaining member
states. Additionally, some minor compensation payments received by other member countries (e.g.
Sweden and the Netherlands) are also included in the calculations.
15Several alternative political power indices have been considered in the estimations, such as
Banzhaf, Johnston, Public Good, and Deegan-Packel indices, see Kurz (2014) for a recent overview
on power indices. However, none of these power indices improved the explanatory power shown by
the Shapley-Shubik or the nucleolus. The Banzhaf and the Johnston indices show similar levels of
the adjusted R2 while there are plenty of independent variables that are not significant. The Public
Good and the Deegan-Packel indices seem to be more sensitive to changes in the model specification.
16Budget shares have been calculated using the information taken from the European Commission
financial reports. The remaining data were taken from the Eurostat statistics website. Political
power indices have been calculated as described in Appendix 1.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
exp 0.0583 0.0530 0.0002 0.2256
expadj 0.0584 0.0529 0.000 0.2256
pssi 0.0643 0.0474 0.0081 0.1786
pnucl 0.0643 0.0641 0.000 0.2500
agri 0.0643 0.0720 0.0004 0.3383
income 1.0000 0.3214 0.4087 2.6786
One may observe that the SSI shows higher dispersion levels as compared to the
nucleolus. The average expenditure budget percentage received is around 6%. It is
also worth mentioning that the variables representing budget needs present high levels
of dispersion. Thus, country members are heterogeneous in terms of their economic
structure.
4.2 Results
In order to carry out a sensitivity analysis, we have proposed four different speci-
fications. Estimates appear in Tables 3-7. The four specifications are the result of
combining two different dependent variables (exp in Tables 3 and 4; expadj in Tables
5 and 6) with the two political power indices described earlier (pssi in Tables 3 and 5;
pnucl in Tables 4 and 6). Finally, Table 7 provides the basis for a comparison of the
four specifications, as marginal effects are reported.
Regarding the econometric techniques, we have considered several models. First,
we keep the pooled baseline Ordinary Least Squares specification (OLS) originally
proposed by Kauppi and Widgre´n (2004), in order for it to be compared with more
sophisticated techniques. The analysis presented in the current paper suggests un-
observable heterogeneity due to the strong differences among country members from
different perspectives. Moreover, since the dependent variable is a share, economet-
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ric methods should be adapted to take this into account. Thus, OLS seems to be a
non-robust econometric technique in this context.
In order to resolve any issues associated with the OLS method, two fractional
methodologies have been proposed. First, a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) based
on a probit distribution has been applied. Second, since our panel data is clearly un-
balanced, an alternative fractional model based on probit distribution has been con-
sidered (FHETPROB). Note that the nature of unbalancedness could require models
that explicitly allow for heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2010a,b). In both cases, a
clustered option has been used to estimate the variance−covariance matrix.
Additionally, Equation (1) has been extended to include a set of variables that
consider the effect of the EU enlargement (EU). In this respect, a set of dummy
variables has been defined: EU10, EU12, EU15, EU25, EU27. Those variables
take the value of 1 when the number of country members is 10, 12, 14, 25 and
27 respectively, and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, some interactions of these dummy
variables with the political power indices have been considered, since there could be
different impacts of power depending on the number of countries integrated into the
EU. The dummy variables have been included in OLS (denoted by OLSd), GLM and
FHETPROB models.
Moreover, additional dummy variables have been generated (Wooldridge, 2010b)
in order to capture the panel unbalancedness structure in the context of the FHET-
PROB specification. Assuming that the global panel data set is composed of different
subpanels Ti, both the outcome and variance equation are allowed to depend on the
number of observations in each subpanel. The new dummy variables are denoted by
tobs32, tobs27, tob18, tobs9, tobs6, and take the value 1 when the country is observed
for 32, 27, 18, 9 and 6 years respectively, and 0 otherwise.
The results show some general facts that are observed in the majority of cases.
Both power and needs are significant key drivers of budget allocation. Thus, the
higher the political power, the higher the expenditure share. Additionally, those
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countries with more intensive agricultural activity and lower relative income emerge
as the beneficiaries of EU policies, as they receive higher shares of the overall budget.
Regarding the econometric models, and comparing both fractional techniques, it
seems that FHETPROB enables an encreased significance of the three main variables
related to power and needs. The inclusion of a variance equation based on the unbal-
ancedness structure helps to refine the results. In all the specifications, the majority
of variables explaining the variance are highly significant.
When comparing the performance of different models and when focusing on alter-
native power indices, there are also interesting findings. In terms of OLS regressions,
the adjusted R2 values show that models based on pssi have a higher explanatory
power than those based on pnucl. However, the differences are considerably smaller
when dummy variables representative of EU enlargement process are included in the
analysis. Thus, both power indices seem to perform similarly. Differences in terms
of information criteria (aic, bic) show that fractional models using different power
indices are also very close to each other. Comparing Tables 5 and 6, the highest lag
in information criteria between both power indices is registered for the specification
where adjusted budget shares are explained and heteroskedascitity is modelled. In
this particular case, the nucleolus performs better.
Regarding enlargement, two interesting effects are noted. First, the EU dummy
variables show that budget shares decrease with the EU size. Thus, the larger the
number of country members, the lower the average budget share. Second, power
interactions with temporal dummies show that there are different impacts of power
in different subperiods, especially when the nucleolus is included in the specifications.
In general, the period 2004-2006 (EU25) is one where country members achieve higher
relative returns from their political power. When the number of country members
experience a substantial increase, those countries with higher power levels obtain
higher relative gains.
As mentioned earlier, Table 7 provides marginal effects, allowing the compari-
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Table 3: Total budget shares (exp) and the SSI (pssi)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLSd GLM FHETPROB
p ssi 0.545∗∗ 0.493∗∗ 3.781∗∗ 3.675∗∗
agri 0.352∗∗ 0.337∗∗ 1.682∗∗ 1.768∗∗
income -0.005∗ -0.004+ -0.157+ -0.263∗∗
p ssiEU10 0.034 0.490 0.659
p ssiEU12 0.001 1.305 1.401
p ssiEU15 0.199∗∗ 3.213∗ 1.787
p ssiEU25 0.248∗∗ 7.293∗∗ 2.902
p ssiEU27 0.150∗ 7.128∗∗ 2.096
EU10 -0.006 -0.075 -0.103
EU12 -0.002 -0.098 -0.143
EU15 -0.014∗ -0.233 -0.103
EU25 -0.014∗ -0.482∗ -0.142
EU27 -0.010+ -0.450∗ -0.034
tobs32 -0.569
tobs27 0.540∗∗
tobs18 -4.400∗∗
tobs9 0.665∗∗
tobs6 0.918∗∗
cons 0.006∗ 0.012+ -1.830∗∗ -1.722∗∗
lnsigma2
tobs32 0.370
tobs27 -0.419∗∗
tobs18 1.053∗∗
tobs9 -0.711∗∗
tobs6 -1.112∗∗
cluster no no yes yes
N 575 575 575 575
R2 adj 0.88 0.88
chi2 580.92
aic -2940.72 -2945.21 200.09 269.57
bic -2923.30 -2884.25 261.05 356.66
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 4: Total budget shares (exp) and nucleolus (pnucl)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLSd GLM FHETPROB
p nucl 0.221∗∗ 0.204∗∗ 1.369∗ 1.345∗
agri 0.504∗∗ 0.370∗∗ 1.931∗∗ 1.981∗∗
income -0.010∗∗ -0.005∗ -0.168+ -0.277∗∗
p nuclEU10 0.037 0.471+ 0.592∗
p nuclEU12 0.199∗∗ 3.041∗∗ 3.233∗∗
p nuclEU15 0.463∗∗ 5.574∗∗ 3.966∗∗
p nuclEU25 0.528∗∗ 10.102∗∗ 5.008∗
p nuclEU27 0.419∗∗ 9.813∗∗ 4.141∗
EU10 -0.009+ -0.108∗ -0.134∗∗
EU12 -0.026∗∗ -0.323∗∗ -0.374∗∗
EU15 -0.043∗∗ -0.507∗∗ -0.364∗
EU25 -0.043∗∗ -0.770∗∗ -0.388+
EU27 -0.039∗∗ -0.731∗∗ -0.280
tobs32 -0.014
tobs27 0.599∗∗
tobs18 -3.451∗∗
tobs9 0.705∗∗
tobs6 0.889∗∗
cons 0.022∗∗ 0.041∗∗ -1.561∗∗ -1.454∗∗
lnsigma2
tobs32 0.083
tobs27 -0.483∗∗
tobs18 0.889∗∗
tobs9 -0.757∗∗
tobs6 -1.095∗∗
cluster no no yes yes
N 575 575 575 575
R2 adj 0.84 0.87
chi2 641.14
aic -2808.05 -2912.11 200.30 269.76
bic -2790.63 -2851.15 261.26 356.85
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 5: Adjusted budget shares (expadj) and the SSI (pssi)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLSd GLM FHETPROB
p ssi 0.768∗∗ 0.733∗∗ 5.148∗∗ 5.143∗∗
agri 0.200∗∗ 0.157∗∗ 0.704∗ 0.718∗
income -0.002 0.001 -0.103 -0.223∗
p ssiEU10 0.034 0.456 0.493
p ssiEU12 0.080 1.876∗ 2.058∗
p ssiEU15 0.326∗∗ 4.070∗∗ 2.735
p ssiEU25 0.316∗∗ 7.913∗∗ 4.256+
p ssiEU27 0.210∗∗ 7.571∗∗ 3.132
EU10 -0.005 -0.068 -0.071
EU12 -0.007 -0.141 -0.192
EU15 -0.020∗∗ -0.281 -0.153
EU25 -0.012+ -0.490∗ -0.188
EU27 -0.008 -0.443∗ -0.060
tobs32 -4.990
tobs27 0.490∗∗
tobs18 -5.168∗∗
tobs9 0.414∗∗
tobs6 0.931∗∗
cons -0.002 0.000 -1.926∗∗ -1.808∗∗
lnsigma2
tobs32 1.454
tobs27 -0.376∗∗
tobs18 1.163∗∗
tobs9 -0.491∗∗
tobs6 -1.091∗∗
cluster no no yes yes
N 575 575 575 575
R2 adj 0.87 0.88
chi2 1121.58
aic -2926.94 -2964.45 199.72 271.41
bic -2909.53 -2903.49 260.68 362.85
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 6: Adjusted budget shares (expadj) and nucleolus (pnucl)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLSd GLM FHETPROB
p nucl 0.324∗∗ 0.318∗∗ 2.015∗∗ 2.018∗∗
agri 0.404∗∗ 0.198∗∗ 0.965∗ 0.974∗
income -0.009∗∗ -0.001 -0.114 -0.251∗∗
p nuclEU10 0.039 0.477+ 0.602∗
p nuclEU12 0.362∗∗ 4.206∗∗ 4.463∗∗
p nuclEU15 0.719∗∗ 7.274∗∗ 5.688∗∗
p nuclEU25 0.726∗∗ 11.574∗∗ 7.024∗∗
p nuclEU27 0.604∗∗ 11.070∗∗ 5.840∗∗
EU10 -0.010+ -0.114∗ -0.141∗∗
EU12 -0.041∗∗ -0.439∗∗ -0.493∗∗
EU15 -0.062∗∗ -0.646∗∗ -0.499∗
EU25 -0.055∗∗ -0.866∗∗ -0.505∗
EU27 -0.050∗∗ -0.810∗∗ -0.379+
tobs32 -0.217
tobs27 0.589∗∗
tobs18 -3.597∗∗
tobs9 0.464∗∗
tobs6 0.890∗∗
cons 0.020∗∗ 0.043∗∗ -1.574∗∗ -1.439∗∗
lnsigma2
tobs32 0.193
tobs27 -0.487∗∗
tobs18 0.909∗∗
tobs9 -0.547∗∗
tobs6 -1.083∗∗
cluster no no yes yes
N 575 575 575 575
R2 adj 0.81 0.87
chi2 1283.98
aic -2704.59 -2906.01 200.04 269.71
bic -2687.18 -2845.05 261.00 356.80
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
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sion of all models and specifications in terms of impact of power and needs. OLS
techniques tend to overestimate the value of the coefficients, while fractional models
smooth the estimates, since they are more appropriate when modelling shares. An-
other interesting idea emerges where power indices have a higher impact on adjusted
budget share specifications. According to our expectations, once the budget shares
are adjusted to take the UK rebate and other compensation payments into consider-
ation, the explanatory weight of power increases. Nevertheless, the relative weight of
political power is lower when considering the nucleolus, while needs’ factors become
more important. There is no doubt that political power matters, but not as much
as the models with the SSI as a power index have shown. Thus, the specifications
based on the nucleolus show a more balanced situation between power and needs.
The result reinforces the idea that the impact of political power on budget share is
not as important as Kauppi and Widgre´n (2004) predicted.17
17In this respect, the original estimates of the SSI by Kauppi and Widgre´n (2004) for the period
1976-2001 (considering annual data) ranged between 0.545 and 0.645 and between 0.783 and 0.858
for the total budget shares and adjusted budget shares respectively. The impact of agriculture was
estimated in a range between 0.387 and 0.405 and between 0.252 and 0.236 for the total budget
shares and adjusted budget shares respectively. Finally, estimated income coefficient registered
values between -0.025 and 0.008 and between -0.022 and 0.003 for the total budget shares and
adjusted budget shares respectively.
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Table 7: Power versus needs: marginal effects
OLS OLSd GLM FHETPROB
Total budget share/SSI
p ssi 0.545∗∗ 0.493∗∗ 0.345∗∗ 0.426∗∗
agri 0.352∗∗ 0.337∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.205∗∗
income -0.005∗ -0.004+ -0.014+ -0.031∗∗
Total budget share/nucleolus
p nucl 0.221∗∗ 0.204∗∗ 0.125∗ 0.161∗
agri 0.504∗∗ 0.370∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.237∗∗
income -0.010∗∗ -0.005∗ -0.014+ -0.033∗∗
Adjusted budget share/SSI
p ssi 0.768∗∗ 0.733∗∗ 0.466∗∗ 0.563∗∗
agri 0.200∗∗ 0.157∗∗ 0.064∗ 0.079∗
income -0.002 0.001 -0.009 -0.024∗
Adjusted budget share/nucleolus
p nucl 0.324∗∗ 0.318∗∗ 0.183∗∗ 0.235∗∗
agri 0.404∗∗ 0.198∗∗ 0.088∗ 0.114∗
income -0.009∗∗ -0.001 -0.010 -0.029∗∗
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
5 Discussion and future research
The main contribution of this paper is to highlight the role of political power on
the EU budget decisions. Various key drivers of budget shares allocated to each
EU member country have been identified. Both power and needs are significant
factors in explaining expenditure budget allocation among EU member states. Some
previous empirical analysis (Kauppi and Widgre´n, 2004, 2007) show strong prevalence
of political power motives. Their results indicate that a large percentage of budget
expenditures can be attributed to selfish power politics, leaving a small contribution
to the so-called benevolent EU need-based budget policies.
We have carried out an empirical analysis to revisit the findings of Kauppi and
Widgre´n (2004). To this end, we have updated their data set (originally from 1976
21
to 2001, the range has been extended to 2012). Additionally we have compared
alternative political power measures and have applied more sophisticated and rigorous
econometric techniques. We have argued that the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) is a
good alternative to the SSI when explaining the budget share of EU member states,
from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
Our findings show that under simple econometric specifications, both power in-
dices behave in a similar way, although the SSI is slightly superior in terms of ex-
planatory power. However, when using more sophisticated and adequate econometric
techniques, the nucleolus seems to perform better than the SSI.18 In particular, the
nucleolus performs better when considering adjusted budget shares (by compensa-
tions, such as the UK rebate), and when we adjust for the unbalancedness of the
panel data. Moreover, the higher the number of countries competing for EU budget,
the higher the impact of political power on budget shares.
Additionally, we find that the relative weight of political power based on the nu-
cleolus when explaining budget shares is lower than predictions of other models. A
partial explanation may be the fact that the nucleolus can assign zero power to non
dummy players, which is not the case for the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf indices.
Indeed, this occurs for all voting systems until 1994 (see Appendix 1). Needs also
matter, and countries with lower relative income levels and a broader irrigation sector
are recipients of a significant amount of EU resources. These findings are consistent
with the idea that the EU budget is allocated to develop key policies such as the
common agricultural policy and the structural funds. Although political power has
an impact on the EU budgetary decisions, this impact seems to be more moderate
than estimated in previous literature. Definitively, the solidarity principle emerges as
18In general, the voting power need not be proportional to the voting weights (Felsenthal and
Machover, 1998). However, following a na¨ıve approach, we have also performed estimations using
the voting weights instead of the power indices. The results imply that the specifications based on
the power indices perform better. More details are available from the authors upon request.
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a significant key driver of the EU budgetary allocation.
Finally, we would like to pursue this line of research further through a more focused
analysis of specific sections of the EU budget. When modelling bargaining schemes,
interactions among different sections of the EU budget will be considered. Addition-
ally, further empirical analysis will aim to detect factors that increase the probability
of receiving higher budget shares for specific policies.
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Appendix 2
5.1 Technical preliminaries
In this section, we introduce basic notions commonly used to model voting situations,
and then briefly discuss the nucleolus and the Shapley-Shubik index.
We consider a set N = {1, ..., n} of n players or voters, which is often referred to
as an assembly. The power set 2N contains all the subsets of N . A non-empty subset
S ⊆ N is called a coalition. The coalition N is said to be the grand coalition.
A cooperative game with transferable utility in characteristic function form, is a
pair (N, v) with N the set of players and:
v : 2N −→ R : S 7−→ v(S),
which is a map that satisfies v(∅) = 0. The map v is called the characteristic function.
The value v(S) is said to be the value or the worth of coalition S. For simplicity, we
refer to these games as “games in TU form.”
The game (N, v) is said to be simple if:
· the value of a coalition is either 0 or 1: v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for all S ⊆ N ,
· the value of grand coalition is 1: v(N) = 1.
A coalition with a value equal to 1 is said to be winning, and a coalition with
a value equal to 0 is said to be losing. A winning coalition S is minimal if it does
not contain any other winning coalition: v(S) = 1 and v(T ) = 0 for all T ⊂ S.
Furthermore, the set of winning coalitions is denoted by W and the set of minimal
winning coalitions is denoted by Wm. The simple game (N, v) is fully determined
through the pair (N,W).
Furthermore, the simple game is said to be monotonic if supersets of winning
coalitions are winning, i.e., if S ∈ W and T ⊃ S, then T ∈ W . A monotonic simple
game is also called a simple voting game.19
19Several authors also use the term simple game for simple voting games, i.e., where monotonicity
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Voting situations are often described by weighted majority games, for example
the one in the EU Council of Ministers. The game (N, v) is said to be a weighted
majority game if there is an n-tuple w = (ω1, ..., ωn) of non-negative weights with
ω1 + ω2 + ...+ ωn = 1 and a non-negative quota q such that v(S) = 1, if and only if,
the total weight of the players in S exceeds the quota q, i.e.,
v(S) = 1, if and only if,
∑
i∈S
ωi ≥ q.
The pair [q;ω] is called a representation of the game (N, v). Typical examples of
weighted majority games are:
· the majority game: w = (1, 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) and q = (n+ 1)/2,
· the unanimity game: w = (1, 1, ..., 1) and q = n,
· the dictator game: w = (1, 0, 0, ..., 0) and q = 1 (player 1 is the dictator).
A measure of power is a map ξ from the set of simple voting games (N, v) to the
set of n-tuples of real numbers. The value ξi = ξi (N, v) is the power of player i in
the game (N, v) , and it satisfies 0 ≤ ξi ≤ 1.
5.2 Shapley-Shubik Index
One of the most famous power measures used in the literature is the Shapley-Shubik
index.20 Several approaches are used in the literature to present and interpret the
Shapley-Shubik index. Shapley and Shubik (1954) apply the following scheme to
introduce their index. The players vote in order and as a majority is reached, the bill
is passed. The critical21 voter is assumed to be given credit for having passed the bill.
is assumed.
20For the definitions and properties, see Felsenthal and Machover (1998).
21Player i in coalition S is said to be critical in S if without player i the coalition left behind is
loosing, i.e.,
i is critical in S if i ∈ S ∈ W and S \ {i} /∈ W.
If i is not critical in any S ∈ W, then i is a dummy.
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The index is then determined through the assumption of a random voting order.
Definition 1 Let (N, v) be a simple voting game. The Shapley-Shubik index (SSI)
of player i is defined by:
φi = φi(N, v) =
∑
S: i is critical in S
(|S| − 1)! (n− |S|)!
n!
for all i ∈ N . (2)
The advantage of this approach is that it is simple and non-technical. However,
the authors emphasize that this scheme, “is just a convenient conceptual device.”
The main shortcoming of this scheme is that this voting model cannot be considered
realistic: there is no reason why the pivot voter should get all the credit, or why
the order of the grand coalition formation should matter.22 With respect to the
computation the Shapley-Shubik indices of our EU instances, we remark that looping
over all 2n coalitions and determining the critical voters was quick enough for our
purpose, i.e., more advanced methods involving generating functions were not needed.
5.3 The Nucleolus
The nucleolus is a solution concept for cooperative games, which was first formulated
by Schmeidler (1969). In order to introduce it let us consider a characteristic function
game (N, v). For convenience, for some vector x we define:
x(S) ≡
∑
i∈S
xi for any S ⊆ N.
A payoff vector x = (x1, ..., xn) with xi ≥ v(i) and x(N) = v(N) is called an
imputation. We denote by X(N, v) the set of all imputations of the game (N, v).
Let x be an imputation, then for any coalition S the excess of S is defined as:
e(S, x) = v(S)− x(S).
One might interpret this number as a measure of “dissatisfaction” for coalition
S at imputation x. For any imputation x let S1, ..., S2n−1 be an ordering of the
22For more detailed discussion, see Felsenthal and Machover (1998).
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coalitions for which e (Sl, x) ≥ e (Sl+1, x) for l = 1, ..., 2n − 2. Let E(x) be the vector
of excess defined as El(x) = e (Sl, x) for all l = 1, ..., 2
n − 1. We say that E(x) is
lexicographically less than E(y) if:
El(x) < El(y) for the smallest l for which El(x) 6= El(y).
We denote this relation by E(x) ≺lexmin E(y).
Definition 2 The nucleolus is the set of imputations x for which the vector E(x) is
lexicographically minimal:
ν = ν(N, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) : @y ∈ X(N, v) : E(y) ≺lexmin E(x)} .
The following recursive procedure is used to characterize the nucleolus. By defini-
tion, E1 (x) is the largest excess of any coalition relative to x. At the first step of the
procedure we find the set X1 of all imputations x that minimizes E1 (x):
min 
s.t. e(S, x) ≤  for all S, ∅ " S " N
and x(N) = v(N).
.
The set X1 is called the least core of c. If it is not a unique point, we find
the set X2 of all x in X1 that minimizes E2 (x), the second largest excess and so
on. This process eventually leads to an Xk consisting of a single imputation, called
the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969; Maschler et al., 1979). The nucleolus recursively
minimizes the ”dissatisfaction” of the worst treated coalitions.23
It has been proved that the nucleolus of a game in coalitional form exists and it
is unique. Moreover, if the core is not empty, the nucleolus is in the core (Maschler
et al., 2013).
23Notwithstanding the general recursive definition of the nucleolus, the computation of X1 was
sufficient in all EU instances, i.e., a single linear program has to be solved. The uniqueness of the
solution was verified using the complementary slackness condition.
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